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(Un)Employment (forthcoming).
ABSTRACT: Globalization involves the international expansion of
market relations and the global pursuit of economic liberalism. The
essential factor in this process is commodification, including the com-
modification of human labor. Globalization integrates an increasing
proportion of the world population directly into capitalist labor mar-
kets and locks national and regional labor markets into an integrated
global labor market. We are on the threshold of global initiatives to
shift the balance even further, especially regarding the management
of global migration flows. The answer cannot be a return to strictly
national forms of migration control and should not be a complete ca-
pitulation to market-driven regulation of migration. One possible an-
swer is a new, multilateral, democratically screened, global migration
regime to set forth and guarantee the general principles governing
the regulation of transnational migrations, ensure proper coordi-
nation between regional and national migration regimes, and call
into existence new institutional forms of transnational democratic
governance.
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GLOBALIZATION is a sociopoliti-cal project involving the &dquo;world-
wide application of laissez-faire prin-
ciples&dquo; (Munck 2002 [this issue]). Yet
the principles of laissez-faire are un-
evenly applied to different categories
of commodities in the global political
economy today The zeal with which
the free movement of goods is pur-
sued through the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO), or the free move-
ment of capital promoted by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF),
is contrasted by the hostility of most
governments and international orga-
nizations toward the free movement
of labor.
A closer look at the real nature of
the globalization project will reveal
that this paradox entails no contra-
diction. After all, the globalization
project is about the freedom of capital
to maximize its accumulation poten-
tial, not about libertarian ideals.
Second, this article investigates
the emerging global and regional
regulatory structures whose purpose
it is to accommodate capital’s free-
dom to accumulate as far as it con-
cerns the movement of labor. It will
be argued that these new modes of
governance are characterized by
their informal and disciplinary
nature, thus demonstrating the
severely negative implications for
democratic accountability of those
involved in policy making.
The final argument of this article
will be that there is a contradiction
between untrammeled commodifica-
tion on one hand and emancipation
from bondage and deprivation on the
other. To prevent the regulation of
global migration from privileging
deeper commodification over
emancipation, transparency and
accountability in the institutional
setup are indispensable. The article
advocates consensual multilateral-
ism instead of de facto bilateralism.
NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION
AND MOBILITY
Neoliberal globalization is both
process and project. While it is
important to emphasize the role of
agency in globalization, it is equally
important to understand the process
of structural transformation
involved. Globalization is a dialecti-
cal phenomenon simultaneously cir-
cumscribed by agency and structure
mutually constitutive of each other,
or to borrow Robert Cox’s (1981)
phrase, a &dquo;historical structure.&dquo;
Viewed in this way, globalization con-
sists in the dialectic between the
expansion of market relations on one
hand and the pursuit of economic lib-
eralism on the other. In its late twen-
tieth/early twenty-first century man-
ifestation, globalization is reaching
new highs, or should we say new
depths.
Globalization entails a qualitative
transformation in the political, eco-
nomic, cultural, strategic, and tech-
nological worlds around us of which I
mention three elements: the com-
pression of time and space, the rise of
a market-oriented neoliberal polit-
ico-economic order, and the transi-
tion in world politics from the bipolar
cold war order of system rivalry to
the present unipolar NATO-Ameri-
can order.
The essential moving factor of this
process is the expansion of the mar-
ket : ever more people, countries, and
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regions are incorporated into the
global market economy (expansion
as geographic widening), and more
and more spheres and dimensions of
human existence are invaded by
market relations and subordinated
to the pursuit of private profit
(expansion as deepening).
This deepening commodification
takes place through three interre-
lated processes, namely, the
transnationalization of production,
the globalization of financial mar-
kets, and the tendential emergence of
a global labor market. The first two
aspects of what is commonly called
globalization are abundantly docu-
mented in much of the globalization
literature. These aspects, although
by no means beyond dispute, need
not be addressed here. For the pur-
poses of this contribution, it is more
relevant to focus on the third
element.
In their path-breaking study of
the new international division of
labor of the 1970s, the German
researchers Fr6bel, Heinrichs, and
Kreye (1977) observed an accelerat-
ing relocation of labor-intensive pro-
duction processes from the older
industrial economies to low wage
countries in Asia and Latin America.
Three preconditions made this relo-
cation drive possible: the existence of
a sheer inexhaustible reservoir of
cheap labor in large parts of the
Third World, new production tech-
nologies’ making it possible to sepa-
rate the labor-intensive parts of the
production process from the capital-
intensive parts, and new transport
and communication technologies’
facilitating the coordination of dis-
persed production and assembly
establishments. The authors con-
cluded that &dquo;the conjuncture of these
three conditions ... has created a sin-
gle world market for labor power, a
true worldwide industrial reserve
army, and a single world market for
production sites&dquo; (p. 30, author’s
translation). Crucial for this argu-
ment is that as a consequence of the
rapid development of new communi-
cation and information technology,
foreign direct investment (FDI)
became a functional alternative not
only to trade but also to labor migra-
tion. (Mobility of capital can substi-
tute for the mobility of goods and
labor power.)
In the core of the global system, in
the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD)
countries, globalization has trans-
formed the economy from a Fordist
model (with mass production and
mass consumption sustained by one
or another form of welfare state) into
a model of flexible accumulation
(with lean production and just-in-
time delivery supported by a compe-
tition state). This has had the funda-
mental consequence for the labor
market of establishing a &dquo;core-pe-
riphery&dquo; structure within the ad-
vanced capitalist economies (Cox
1987), reflected particularly in the
&dquo;peripheralization&dquo; of labor in the
global cities (cf. Harris 1995; Sassen
1996a). One element of this has been
the reemergence of domestic labor,
another the reappearance of sweat-
shop production in the garment
industry:
There exists within New York, the global
city, a substantial growing segment of the
labor force whose conditions of produc-
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tion resemble those of the labor force in
the Third World.... Sweatshops in New
York are the logical consequence of the
global restructuring of production in the
garment industry and the consequent
competition for jobs between segments of
the global reserve of labor. (Ross and
Trachte 1983, 416)
These developments go hand in hand
with, and are enhanced by, a
neoliberal offensive of deregulation,
liberalization, and flexibilization.
While undermining the bargaining
power of organized labor and helping
to depress wage demands, it simulta-
neously creates and/or reinforces the
demand for various forms of un-
skilled and semiskilled labor, em-
ployed under increasingly precarious
conditions (Cox 1987; Sassen 1996a;
Castells 1998). Undocumented im-
migration is quite functional from
this perspective. The employment of
undocumented foreign labor has
thus in many cases become a condi-
tion for the continued existence of
small- and medium-size firms, creat-
ing a substantial economic interest
in continued (illegal) immigration
(Brochmann 1993, 119-20; see also
Papademetriou 1994, 27).
In more peripheral areas of the
world (e.g., Africa, eastern Europe,
and Central America), the two most
important changes since the mid-
seventies (often interacting) have
been the debt crisis, the ensuing
imposition of structural adjustment
policies, and the end of the cold war.
The Structural Adjustment Pro-
grams of the IMF and the World
Bank and the withdrawal of military
and economic assistance by the
superpowers both resulted in a sub-
stantial reduction of external sources
of finance available for redistribution
by the state. In many cases, this seri-
ously affected the ability of govern-
ments to co-opt rivaling elites into
the power structure, resulting in
serious social and political crises,
economic disasters, and regime
change or state collapse. These com-
plex processes largely explain the
surge in forced movements of people
since the mid-seventies across the
globe, in search of protection and in
search of a new and better life (cf.
Cohen and Deng 1998; Loescher
1993; United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees 1997; Zolberg,
Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). In other
cases, governments of Third World
countries have turned to other
sources of external income and have
become intricately involved in the
business of promoting outward
migration of skilled workers and pro-
fessionals. Through workers’ remit-
tances, the inflow of hard currency is
thus increased. Worldwide, remit-
tances have surpassed development
aid as a source of foreign exchange. In
1995, worldwide remittances ran to
$70 billion; in the same year, develop-
ment aid total ran to $66 billion
(World Bank 1997). India and Egypt
are two examples of countries in
which the government has taken an
active role in this trade. In the 1970s,
the Egyptian government &dquo;planned
to expand the output of teachers in
order to supply 14,000 of them to the
oil-producing countries&dquo; (Harris
1995, 151). The Indian government
recently announced plans to spend
$650 million to double India’s cur-
rent annual output of 100,000 infor-
mation technology graduates by
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2002 and reach 500,000 by 2005
(Chanda 2000).’
These developments in various
parts of the world show that global-
ization indeed integrates an increas-
ing proportion of the world popula-
tion directly into capitalist labor
markets and locks national and
regional labor markets into an inte-
grated global labor market. The
mechanisms that produce this effect
are of three kinds.
First, we witness various forms of
commodification of labor power,
which was not previously bought and
sold on &dquo;free&dquo; labor markets. We can
think of three forms in particular:
~ incorporation of previously discon-
nected areas (primarily former so-
cialist economies but also the re-
maining precapitalist societies on
the outskirts of the modern world)
into the capitalist world market,
~ continuing proletarianization of the
world’s population through urban-
ization and the disintegration of
subsistence economies in the Third
World and through increasing labor
market participation in the indus-
trial economies, and
~ privatization of economic activities
within capitalist societies previ-
ously organized outside the market.
Second, nationally or regionally
bounded labor markets are increas-
ingly integrated by the internation-
alization of production. The impor-
tance of this new form of inter-
nationalization as contrasted with
the earlier phases of globalization in
which commercial capital and money
capital moved across borders cannot
be overstated. Whereas money capi-
tal imposes an abstract and indirect
discipline on labor, FDI directly re-
produces capitalist relations of
production within the host countries
(Poulantzas 1974).2 Transnational
production has indeed become by far
the most important engine of accu-
mulation in the global economy, as is
confirmed by a few key statistics:
~ After a slowdown in the early 1990s,
direct investments were growing
explosively in the closing years of
the century. As a consequence, the
share of foreign investment inflows
in world gross fixed capital forma-
tion has grown rapidly, from 1.1 per-
cent in 1960 via 2.0 percent in 1980
to 7.4 percent in 1997 (United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and De-
velopment [UNCTAD] 1994,1998).
~ By 1997, total assets of foreign affil-
iates of transnational corporations
stood at $12.6 trillion. Sales by for-
eign subsidiaries reached $9.5 tril-
lion (UNCTAD 1998, 2). In addition
to FDI, through strategic alliances
and other nonequity arrangements,
transnational corporations gain
control over assets and markets that
are not measured in the statistics.
~ In 1960, worldwide sales by foreign
affiliates of transnational corpora-
tions were smaller than world ex-
ports, but in 1997, they stood at 148
percent of world exports (UNCTAD
1998, 2).
~ One-third of world exports are ex-
ports of foreign affiliates (UNCTAD
1998, 6).
~ Transnational corporations have a
strong impact on the shape of the
world economy: &dquo;they organize the
production process internationally:
by placing their affiliates world-
wide under common governance
systems, they interweave produc-
tion activities located in different
countries, create an international
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intra-firm division of labor and, in
the process, internalize a range of
international transactions that
would otherwise have taken place
in the market&dquo; (UNCTAD 1994, 9).
~ The rapid expansion of FDI is in-
creasingly tied up with the explo-
sive increase in mergers and acqui-
sitions in the world. The total value
of cross-border mergers and acqui-
sitions in 1997 was approximately
$342 billion (up from less than $100
billion in 1992), representing 58
percent of FDI flows (UNCTAD
1998, 19-20).
~ Cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions are mostly concentrated
within the developed world, thus re-
inforcing tremendously the process
of transnationalization, the rapidly
intensifying interpenetration of the
economies (capital markets but
also labor markets) of the OECD
countries.
Third, nationally or regionally
bounded labor markets are further
integrated by increased interna-
tional labor mobility in its various
forms:
~ the spread of transnational corpo-
rations brings with it increased in-
ternational mobility of top- and in-
termediate-level managers and
executives;
~ the internationalization of services
(engineering, advertising, software
development) creates increased in-
ternational mobility of technical
and commercial experts;
~ the combination of more restrictive
immigration policies and labor mar-
ket flexibilization and deregulation
in the OECD countries creates in-
creased opportunities for illegal im-
migration (increasingly through
the intervention of organized
crime); and
· the economic and political crisis of
the state in many Third World coun-
tries and the resulting intensifica-
tion of social and ethnic conflicts
swell the ranks of international ref-
ugee movements and the outward
flow of migrant workers.
With the tendential formation of a
global labor market and the in-
creased labor mobility it implies, the
question of the international regula-
tion of that mobility has gradually
become a more prominent issue on
the international agenda. Before we
can turn to a discussion of the emerg-
ing framework for the regulation of
global migration, however, we must
briefly address some general issues
of global governance in the neoliberal
age.
GLOBALIZATION
AND GOVERNANCE
Changes in production organiza-
tion and location have been accompa-
nied by attempts at the political and
ideological levels to create more
transnational forms of governance.
The key elements of the emerging
structure of global governance can be
summarized as follows (see Cox
1987; Gill 1995; McMichael 1996):
1. emerging consensus among
policy makers favoring market-
based over state-managed solutions,
2. centralized management of
the global economy by the G-7 states,
and
3. implementation and surveil-
lance by multilateral agencies such
as the World Bank, the IMF, and the
WTO.
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The key development in this respect
is the reconfiguration of the state.
State forms and functions are being
transformed under the impact of, but
in turn itself furthering, globaliza-
tion. Global restructuring leads to (or
implies) the creation of additional
formal and informal structures of au-
thority and sovereignty besides and
beyond the state. With globalization
and the progression of the neoliberal
ideology, there has also been a
strengthening of (quasi-) authoritar-
ian structures and practices and an
assault on established forms of pro-
gressive or Left popular participa-
tion. In the core areas of the world
economy, this discipline appears in
the shape of voluntary programs of
competitive deregulation and auster-
ity that are codified and constitu-
tionalized in such arrangements as
the Economic and Monetary Union
stability pact or the WTO liberaliza-
tion regime.
In peripheral areas, the discipline
of the market is often externally
imposed through the financial power
exercised by the IMF and the World
Bank, which was tremendously
intensified after the debt crisis of the
1980s.
In the context of globalization, the
functions of the state dealing with
transnational processes are increas-
ingly performed transnationally by a
variety of state, interstate, and
nonstate institutions. The state is no
longer the proverbial Westphalian
nation-state in which sovereignty
and territoriality are exclusively
combined. Indeed, the &dquo;unbundling&dquo;
of sovereignty and territoriality
(Ruggie 1993, 165) makes it possible
for governments to circumvent the
need to account for the international
agreements they conclude in their
own national parliaments. It has also
created a greater space for social
forces outside the state to become
involved in new forms of regulation.
The boundaries between public and
private regulation and between
national and international relations
are becoming increasingly blurred,
and policy formation in international
contexts is increasingly informal-
ized, opening up the channels of gov-
ernance to nongovernmental organi-
zations of various kinds. In a
reference to the manifestation of this
tendency in the area of migration pol-
icy, Saskia Sassen (1996b) observed
that &dquo;we are seeing a de facto
transnationalizing of immigration
policy&dquo; in which there is &dquo;a displace-
ment of government functions on to
non-governmental or quasi-govern-
mental institutions and criteria for
legitimacy&dquo; (pp. 1, 24). It is to this
particular area of global governance
that we now turn.
THE EMERGENCE OF A
NEOLIBERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
THE MANAGEMENT OF MOBILITY
In the postwar order, interna-
tional labor migration was hardly
regulated. This provided a sharp con-
trast with the regulatory framework
for financial relations (IMF, Bank for
International Settlements) and for
international trade (GATT). To be
sure, there are international organi-
zations that are concerned one way
or another with the international
mobility of people, such as the Inter-
national Labor Organization, the
International Organization for
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Migration, and of course the United
Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees. However, the regime they
form (if we may call it that) has been
far weaker than the financial and
trade regimes. Several explanations
are possible for this state of affairs.
For one, as is often observed in the
migration literature, the sovereign
state is assumed to be unwilling to
relinquish control over who crosses
its borders: &dquo;Since the development
of the modern state from the fif-
teenth century onward, governments
have regarded control over their bor-
ders as the core of sovereignty&dquo;
(Weiner 1995, 9). The argument does
not convince, because state sover-
eignty has never been absolute, nor is
this an argument that would apply
exclusively to migration as opposed
to other cross-border traffic such as
trade. A second possible explanation
is the modest scale of international
migration in the twentieth century.
The United Nations estimated the
world’s foreign-born population for
1995 at 125 million or about 2 per-
cent of the world’s population
(UNCTAD/International Organiza-
tion for Migration 1996). Finally, dur-
ing the post-1945 decades of embed-
ded liberalism, foreign labor was
available in surplus quantities, and
as a consequence, states did not need
to compete for scarce sources when
organizing their recruitment
schemes in the 1960s and 1970s
(Zolberg 1991, 309, 313-4).
With the effects of globalization on
the mobility of people becoming
stronger, the call for an effective in-
ternational migration regime also
gained strength (for a survey, see
Ghosh 2000). Four effects stand out:
o the growth of asylum migration to
the OECD countries;
o the growing demand for cheap un-
skilled labor, the growth of illegal
labor immigration, and the increas-
ing involvement of organized crime
with smuggling people across
borders;
9 the shortage of highly skilled labor
in the OECD in sectors such as in-
formation and communication tech-
nology ; and
9 the increased mobility of upper-
level managers in transnational
corporations.
As a result, two seemingly contradic-
tory tendencies are visible in the on-
going policy discussions, namely, the
effort to control and reduce asylum
migration and illegal migration and
the call (especially since the mid-
1990s) to liberalize forms of migra-
tion that are deemed economically
desirable. To understand better how
this contradiction translates into
regulation, we must briefly analyze
the interface between the various
forms of factor mobility in the global
economy, especially in the Americas
and in Europe.
The idea of mobility is, as we have
seen, usually associated with the
movement of capital more than of
people. In the Americas, some twenty
bilateral agreements have been
signed since 1990 that serve to liber-
alize trade and investment between
South, Central, and North American
countries. Here the emphasis is pri-
marily on the subordination of
migration management to the needs
of capital. In Europe, the significance
of arrangements facilitating the
mobility of capital within the region
(primarily the completion of the
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Single Market and the flexibilization
of labor markets) has overshadowed
the number of initiatives which
European capital developed in
peripheral economies. Nevertheless,
in the framework of increasing coop-
eration and economic aid, the Euro-
pean Union has signed a series of
accession and association agree-
ments with countries of central and
eastern Europe, with the Mediterra-
nean countries, and with the remain-
ing states of the former Soviet Union.
These agreements all have in com-
mon a number of regulations with
respect to the freedom of movement
of people insofar as this movement is
connected to capital mobility. Free-
dom of establishment, freedom to
migrate to set up businesses as self-
employed individuals, and nondis-
crimination (national treatment) of
legally established firms, workers,
and their families (cf. Niessen and
Mochel 1999) are the key elements.3 3
These rules about national treat-
ment for investments and labor tend
to have repercussions on labor mar-
kets, on industrial policies, and on
judicial systems. The movement of
capital requires some mobility of peo-
ple as well, for labor market pur-
poses, but also for access to land and
to markets. Especially relevant here
is the movement of professionals and
business people whose professions
are related to trade in services. Their
movement is encoded in bilateral or
trilateral treaties, regional agree-
ments (NAFTA, European Economic
Area), and global agreements (Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services
[GATS]) (see Ghosh 1997; OECD
Syst6me d’observation permanente
des migrations 1998).
In addition to the formal arrange-
ments the European states (east and
west) have developed, there is a par-
allel system of informal consulta-
tions on migration issues, the so-
called Budapest Group.4 The origins
of the Budapest Process go back to
the events leading up to the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union. The pri-
mary objective of the consultations
was to discuss measures for checking
illegal migration from and through
central and eastern Europe. Much
emphasis was put on the need to
strengthen the surveillance of bor-
ders, the conclusion of readmission
agreements, and the harmonization
of visa policies. Technological and
financial aid was promised. During
follow-up meetings, the themes that
would dominate subsequent confer-
ences became clear: criminalization
of trafficking and improvement of
police forces and border controls,
imposition of carrier sanctions on
airlines, exchange of information,
conclusion of readmission agree-
ments, and financial assistance to
the central and east European coun-
tries (which were in reality the tar-
gets of these measures given their
deficient or totally absent relevant
legislation and policies). The statu-
tory meeting of the Budapest Group
(December 1993) reconfirmed these
objectives and decided that the group
would comprise senior officials from
all participating states, making the
Budapest Group into the only pan-
European discussion forum for these
issues. The issue of visa approxima-
tion was taken up at a special meet-
ing in Portoroz (Slovenia) in Septem-
ber 1998. The harmonization of visa
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policies is to be achieved by the cen-
tral and east European states align-
ing their policies with those of the
European Union member states. In
recent years, the Budapest Group
has also set up an elaborate monitor-
ing system to keep track of the prog-
ress with the implementation of
agreed measures, thus acquiring a
very real influence over national pol-
icy making.
In the Americas, most of the
regional integration processes ignore
or sidetrack the question of the move-
ment of people. This is the case with
the Mercado Comun del Sur (South-
ern Cone Common Market), with
NAFTA, and with the series of bilat-
eral treaties on free trade in the
region. Yet despite limited state reg-
ulations, labor migration repre-
sented a significant dimension of
transborder economic activities, con-
trolled mostly by the private sectors.
The Puebla Process, which started in
1996 under the name Regional Con-
ference on Migration (RCM), marks a
significant step in the region-
alization trend in migration control.5 5
Officially, the direct trigger of the
RCM was the population conference
in Cairo in 1994, but it was also
linked to the plans for the Free Trade
Area of the Americas, which is to
extend the liberalization of national
economies to Central and South
America. The immediate initiative
for the Puebla Process came from
Mexico, a country facing important
pressures from both its northern
partners, particularly the United
States, to control the flows of people
crossing the border and from its
southern neighbors in the form of
transit migration. The RCM’s plan of
action, adopted in 1997 during its
second annual meeting in Panama,
focused on information gathering as
well as on five areas of activities: (1)
the formulation of migration policies
(both emigration and immigration)
that would respond to the commit-
ments of the conference, (2) migra-
tion and development, (3) combating
migrant trafficking, (4) collaboration
for the return of extraregional
migrants, and (5) human rights. Most
of the work of the RCM has been
devoted, since then, to the combating
of migrant trafficking while the area
of activity that received the least
attention was the formulation of har-
monized migration policies. Yet para-
doxically, some form of coordination
of these policies does take place, but
indirectly, notably through the pro-
motion by the RCM of transborder
and labor market cooperation
schemes.
There is obviously a clear analogy
between the Puebla Process and the
Budapest Process in terms of which
issues are central to their work. They
share, in particular, emphases on the
coordination of visa and migration
policy, on the combating of illegal
trafficking, and on the promotion of a
system of readmission agreements.
These informal modes of governance
fulfil very specific functions. They
first of all serve as channels for com-
munication between policy makers,
experts, and interested third parties.
This is especially important for those
countries (e.g., several of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States
countries) whose officials have little
or no direct contact with their coun-
terparts in the OECD world. Beyond
that, they further serve to socialize
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the officials, experts, and policy mak-
ers of peripheral states into the exist-
ing epistemic communities in the
migration field within the OECD,
and they help to moor the policy
reforms desired by the OECD part-
ners within the associated states:
migration policies deemed desirable
by the OECD partners are thus
locked in within the dependent
states. Finally, in the case of the rela-
tionship between the European
Union and a number of the central
and east European states involved,
the Budapest Process is clearly com-
plementary to the ongoing accession
process and prepares the ground, in
the area of the regulation of people’s
mobility, for ultimate full member-
ship of the European Union.
These neoliberal forms of mobility
controls will not disappear with
political changes in countries at the
receiving end. Because of their inclu-
sion into regional frameworks of
integration, these mechanisms
become locked in, and it would be
extremely costly, both economically
and politically, not to respect them
(Gill 1998). Accordingly, states
become more accountable to external
than to internal forces. States are
made responsible for maintaining
the direction or the orientation taken
by the regional system and to uphold-
ing the principles or social purpose of
the agreements signed. Both the
Budapest Process and the Puebla
Process have developed mechanisms
to strengthen these tendencies and
to monitor the compliance of the par-
ticipating states. Particular empha-
sis is placed in both contexts on the
selective criminalization of
migration.
In fact, the selective criminaliza-
tion of specific forms of migration
and the privileged treatment of other
types of mobility is functional not
only in the context of proliferating
neoliberal labor market reforms but
also in the context of redrawing the
boundaries of the regions concerned.
Both in the case of the Americas and
in the case of Europe, we observe the
restructuring of regional hierarchies.
Certain countries or regions are
gradually integrated into the OECD
heartland (Mexico, Central Europe,
and possibly in the long run, Turkey).
These countries are themselves
becoming destination countries for
migrants from the outer layers of the
emerging new regional geohier-
archies (just as a decade ago the
southern European countries made
the transition from migrant-sending
to migrant-receiving countries
against the background of their inte-
gration into the hegemonic struc-
tures of the West). Other countries
are recast in the role of dependent
(semi-) peripheries, whose migrant
workers are admitted to the heart-
land countries only on the strictest
conditions, and who are themselves
burdened with the task of policing
their borders with the external world
whose people can come in only as ille-
gal migrants (and in decreasing mea-
sure as asylum seekers) (cf. van
Buuren 1999).6
To summarize this section, Neo-
liberal restructuring of the global
economy involves both the deepening
and the widening of market relations
and the transformation of gover-
nance structures. Labor has a spe-
cific role in this process: because
international labor migration is only
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
85
one way in which global capital can
access the emerging global labor
market, the emerging global regime
for labor involves both the disciplin-
ing of labor and the selective freeing
of the mobility of labor. There is
clearly a tension between regulating
migration under the auspices of
global neoliberalism on one hand and
upholding the values of democratic
governance on the other. When we
turn to discuss the contours of a pos-
sible new comprehensive framework
for the regulation of global migration
in the next section, we shall therefore
emphasize the importance of demo-
cratic multilateralism as a safeguard
against downward harmonization
through disciplinary neoliberal pol-
icy competition.
IMPLICATIONS FOR A
FUTURE MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT ON MIGRATION
We have, in the preceding analy-
sis, argued that the contemporary
migration issues must be viewed
against the backdrop of globaliza-
tion. Likewise, if we want to specu-
late on the contours of a future inter-
national migration regime, let us
first look at the implications of glob-
alization for such an enterprise.
First, unless an effort is made to
address the underlying causes, espe-
cially of all forms of involuntary
migration, any effort to create an
international migration convention
will inevitably result in the codifica-
tion of the existing extremely restric-
tive immigration practices of most of
the countries of destination. The
international community (this often
abused eulogism) must address the
structural inequities in the global
political economy producing and/or
reproducing poverty among two-
thirds of the world’s population (such
as unequal exchange, the dumping of
agricultural surpluses, etc.). It
should also look very critically at the
global arms trade that fuels many of
the refugee-producing conflicts
around the globe. Especially where
arms trade and neocolonial political
interference with (if not initiation of)
regional and local conflicts by major
powers coincide, the results have
been disastrous.
Second, the particular character of
globalization as a process of deepen-
ing commodification and as a project
of privileging the market over public
regulation suggests that to be demo-
cratic and responsive to the needs of
all people, certain fundamental prin-
ciples must underlie any regulatory
project. It is, first, of crucial impor-
tance that the trend to further com-
modification is reversed and that
essential spheres of human life are
wholly or partly decommodified. This
implies also that we must reassert
the primacy of public governance as
opposed to the market-led gover-
nance, which neoliberalism advo-
cates for those areas where the inter-
ests of capital predominate. Finally,
these new forms of public governance
of global processes must provide for
democratic decision making and
grassroots participation, not just at
the national and international levels
but also in transnational settings. At
the national level, the institutions to
implement democratic control and
popular participation exist, at least
in principle if not everywhere in
practice, in the form of political
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parties, parliaments, and legal sys-
tems. At the international level, we
have the institutions and practices of
traditional diplomacy, including the
framework of the United Nations
system, to guarantee the representa-
tion of all sovereign states in the pro-
cess. Notwithstanding its many
shortcomings, it should be obvious
that the United Nations is preferable
as a framework for worldwide agree-
ments to other frameworks. This is so
whether these are international but
with representation based on eco-
nomic strength (such as the IMF or
the WTO) or whether they are bilat-
eral and skewed toward the stron-
gest economic power (as in the bilat-
eral negotiations between the
European Union and the individual
candidate-members on their terms of
entry).
In such a new, democratic, multi-
lateral context, we might envisage
the creation of a comprehensive in-
ternational migration framework
convention. The purpose of this con-
vention is to set forth and guarantee
the general principles governing the
regulation of transnational migra-
tions, to ensure a sufficient degree of
coordination between regional and
national migration regimes, and to
deal with those migratory move-
ments that cannot be covered in a re-
gional setting. There are three major
components in such a regime.
1. The institutional framework
to be developed at the world (and re-
gional) level must be democratic,
that is, transparent and responsive
to the needs of migrants as well as to
those of the participating states. The
organizational forms for such an en-
terprise are still to be developed; they
will need to find a balance between
facilitating grassroots participation
and democratic representation,
which is often lacking in the litera-
ture singing the praises of global civil
society and of transnational
nongovernmental organizations.
2. The asylum and refugee
framework providing the basis for
the existing international refugee re-
gime (i.e., the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion and the 1967 New York Protocol)
must be amended to take account of
the changed nature of international
refugee movements. Here the propos-
als put forward by Zolberg, Suhrke,
and Aguayo (1989) may serve as a
starting point. They propose to intro-
duce as the central principle &dquo;the im-
mediacy and degree of life-threaten-
ing violence&dquo; (p. 270) to afford
protection to the &dquo;victims&dquo; on an
equal footing with the more common
subjects of present asylum law, the
&dquo;activists&dquo; and the &dquo;targets.&dquo; The asy-
lum policies of the OECD countries
deserve special mention here: these
tend to produce illegal immigrants in
large numbers through the practice
of denying official status to asylum
seekers who cannot be returned to
their countries of origin because of
humanitarian concerns.
3. An equivalent framework for
voluntary migration (permanent and
temporary) must be created in which
states undertake to bring their na-
tional and regional immigration poli-
cies in accordance with an interna-
tionally negotiated set of minimum
criteria formulated to safeguard the
interests of migrants as well as the
interests of the signatory states. The
existing provisions of international
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labor organization conventions and
the GATS should be incorporated
into such a framework or replaced by
it where they conflict with the funda-
mental principles set out above. One
important principle to be obeyed here
is that the legal position of long-term
residents must be improved. Both
the return of migrants to their home
countries and their effective integra-
tion into the host society are ob-
structed by their insecure status (i.e.,
by the difficulty in many host coun-
tries of obtaining full membership in
the welfare state and by the difficul-
ties they encounter on return to their
home countries). These problems
could be substantially reduced, for
instance, by expanding the possibili-
ties for dual citizenship or by allow-
ing reimmigration with full retention
of rights in case of failed return
migration.
On the basis of such a comprehen-
sive set of principles, regional migra-
tion conventions can then create the
institutional and operational set-
tings for their practical implementa-
tion. It is plausible that only in re-
gional settings will it be possible to
develop effective instruments to deal
with such undesirable developments
as the increasing role of organized
crime in the trafficking of people (and
drugs and arms). As with Prohibition
in the 1930s, an exclusively repres-
sive policy only raises the price of the
prohibited goods (in this case access
to the labor markets of the OECD
countries) without substantially re-
ducing the flow. These regional re-
gimes might be expected, depending
on specific circumstances, to incorpo-
rate regional development, educa-
tional and employment initiatives,
preferential trade agreements, effec-
tive measures against trafficking in
people, agreements on the readmis-
sion of illegal migrants, arrange-
ments for temporary labor migration,
quota for permanent immigration,
return migration schemes, and im-
provement of the legal position of mi-
grants in host countries. An integral
and comprehensive approach is es-
sential. If certain elements, such as
temporary labor provisions, are real-
ized in isolation from the other ele-
ments and principles, such schemes
are bound to serve only the interests
of the employers looking for cheap
workers. Public governance of these
processes must guarantee the bal-
ance between the various elements of
the conventions.
This article has put forward that
there is a possibly irreconcilable ten-
sion between commodification on one
hand and emancipation and depriva-
tion on the other. The present trend
in the global economy is to privilege
private market forces over public
regulation. We are presently on the
threshold of global initiatives to shift
this balance even further, especially
with respect to the management of
global migration flows. This article
maintains that the answer cannot be
a return to strictly national forms of
migration control and should not be a
complete capitulation to market-
driven regulation of migration.
Polanyi’s (1957) &dquo;double movement&dquo;
is now, more than ever, operative at
the global level, and this implies that
we must actively develop global
forms of social protection (comple-
menting, not replacing, national
forms) to counter the destructive
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effects of deepening commodifica-
tion. Resisting the subordination of
international labor markets to the
neoliberal regimes of the WTO (via
GATS and the Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment) must be an
integral component of the struggle
for a more democratic global eco-
nomic order.
Notes
1. Remittances in India indeed cover more
than half of the negative balance of interna-
tional trade. At the same time, India has illit-
eracy rates of some 35 percent for men and
more than 60 percent for women (World Bank
1997).
2. Financial globalization, that is, the
emergence and growth of global financial mar-
kets, is identified by many as the hallmark of
globalization. From the perspective of the
overall transnationalization of the circuits of
productive capital, the role of global finance is
in a sense secondary, namely, to keep the sys-
tem together and to lock the spatially dis-
persed sites of production and accumulation
into one global system. We will therefore not
discuss this here.
3. Note that national treatment is also one
of the founding principles in the aborted Mul-
tilateral Agreement on Investment and the
GATS.
4. By 1997, the Budapest Group encom-
passed thirty-six European states (including
among the republics of the former Soviet Un-
ion the three Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine,
Moldova, and the Russian Federation), Aus-
tralia, Canada, and the United States, as well
as the Central European Initiative, the Coun-
cil of Europe, the European Union Council Sec-
retariat, the European Commission, the Inter-
governmental Consultations on Asylum,
Refugee and Migration Policies, the Interna-
tional Center for Migration Policy Develop-
ment (functioning as the secretariat of the Bu-
dapest Group), the International 
Organization for Migration, Interpol, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees, the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization, and the United Nations Commission
on Crime Prevention. For more information as
well as sources on the work of the Budapest
Group and also of the Puebla Process, the
reader is referred to Pellerin and Overbeek
(2001).
5. The Puebla Process involved the partici-
pation of ten countries of Central and North
America (Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicara-
gua, Panama, and the United States). A few
countries and international organizations
were invited as observers: Colombia, the Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, and
Peru, as well as the Economic Commission for
Latin America, the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees, and the International
Organization for Migration.
6. Of course, this process of regional
hierarchization intersects with processes of
geostrategic rivalry being played out partly in
the same region, such as NATO intervention
in Kosovo, the involvement of several Western
interests in the Caucasus, and most recently
the entry of Western forces in central Asia
through the war in Afghanistan.
References
Brochmann, G. 1993. "Fortress Eu-
rope"&mdash;A European immigration re-
gime in the making? In Migration: The
politics of contemporary population
movements, 117-32. Papers presented
at the Sampol Conference 1993, Uni-
versity of Bergen, Norway, 21-22
September.
Castells, M. 1998. The information age:
Economy, society and culture III: End
of millennium. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Chanda, Nayan. 2000. The tug of war for
Asia’s best brains. Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, 9 November. Retrieved
from http://www.feer.com/_0011_09/
p038innov.html.
Cohen, R., and F. M. Deng. 1998. Masses
in flight: The global crisis of internal
displacement. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution.
Cox, R. W. 1981. Social forces, states and
world order: Beyond international re-
lations theory. Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 10 (2): 126-55.
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
89
&mdash;. 1987. Production, power and
world order: Social forces in the mak-
ing of history. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Fr&ouml;bel, F., J. Heinrichs, and O. Kreye.
1977. Die neue internationale
Arbeitsteilung. Strukturelle Arbeit-
slosigkeit in den Industriel&auml;ndern und
die Industrialisierung der Entwick-
lungsl&auml;nder. Hamburg, Germany:
Rowohlt.
Ghosh, B. 1997. Gains from global link-
ages: Trade in services and movements
of persons. New York: Macmillan.
&mdash;, ed. 2000. Managing migration.
Time for a new international regime?
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Gill, S. 1995. Globalisation, market civili-
sation, and disciplinary neoliberalism.
Millennium: Journal of International
Studies 24 (3): 399-423.
&mdash;. 1998. European governance and
new constitutionalism: Economic and
monetary union and alternatives to
disciplinary neoliberalism in Europe.
New Political Economy 3:1, 5-26.
Harris, N. 1995. The new untouchables:
Immigration and the new world
worker. London: Penguin.
Loescher, G. 1993. Beyond charity: Inter-
national cooperation and the global
refugee crisis. Oxford, UK: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
McMichael, P. 1996. Development and so-
cial change: A global perspective.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Munck, Ronaldo. 2002. Globalization and
democracy: A new "great transforma-
tion" ? Annals of the American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science
581:10-21.
Niessen, J., and F. Mochel. 1999. EU ex-
ternal relations and international mi-
gration. Brussels, Belgium: Migration
Policy Group.
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Syst&egrave;me d’observa-
tion permanente des migrations. 1998.
Trends in international migration.
Paris: Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
Papademetriou, D. G. 1994. At a cross-
roads : Europe and migration. In Mi-
gration and the new Europe, edited by
K. A. Hamilton, 12-36. Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies.
Pellerin, H., and H. W. Overbeek. 2001.
Neo-Liberal regionalism and the man-
agement of people’s mobility. In Social
forces in the making of the new Europe,
edited by A. Bieler and A. Morton, 137-
57. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave.
Polanyi, Karl. 1957. The great transfor-
mation: The political and economic or-
igins of our time. Boston: Beacon.
Poulantzas, N. 1974. Les classes sociales
dans le capitalisme aujourd’hui. Paris:
Le Seuil.
Ross, R., and K. Trachte. 1983. Global cit-
ies and global classes: The peripheral-
ization of labor in New York City. Re-
view 6 (3): 393-431.
Ruggie, J. G. 1993. Territoriality and be-
yond : Problematizing modernity in in-
ternational relations. International
Organization 47 (1): 139-74.
Sassen, S. 1996a. Losing control? Sover-
eignty in an age of globalization. New
York: Columbia University Press.
&mdash;. 1996b. Transnational economies
and national migration policies. Am-
sterdam : IMES.
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). 1994.
Transnational corporations, employ-
ment and the workplace: An executive
summary. New York: United Nations.
&mdash;. 1998. World investment report
1998: Trends and determinants. New
York: United Nations.
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development/International Organi-
zation for Migration. 1996. Foreign di-
rect investment, trade, aid and migra-
tion. Current studies series A, no. 29,
Unctad/DTCI/27. Geneva: United
Nations.
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
90
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. 1997. The state of the world’s
refugees: A humanitarian agenda. Ox-
ford, UK: Oxford University Press.
van Buuren, J. 1999. Quand l’Union
europ&eacute;enne s’entoure d’un cordon
sanitaire. Le Monde Diplomatique
(January):6-7.
Weiner, M. 1995. The global migration
crisis: Challenge to states and to hu-
man rights. New York: HarperCollins.
World Bank. 1997. World development re-
port: The state in a changing world.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Zolberg, A. R. 1991. Bounded states in a
global market: The uses of interna-
tional labor migrations. In Social the-
ory for a changing society, edited by P.
Bourdieu and J. S. Coleman, 301-25.
Boulder, CO: Westview.
Zolberg, A. R., A. Suhrke, and S. Aguayo.
1989. Escape from violence: Conflict
and the refugee crisis in the developing
world. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 25, 2012ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
